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Abstract 
This paper uses a CGT TU game modified into a coordination experiment to explore the causal effect 
of context on players’ behaviour. An analytical framework focusing on four attributes representative 
of the game’s context is proposed and an experimental protocol based on this framework allows 
testing hypotheses regarding the influence of context on players’ choices. Results show that attributes 
such as Repetition and Communication seem to have a higher influence than Illustration on players’ 
behaviour. The peculiar nature of the experimental results in the control group, showing the 
emergence of a focal point other than the outcome prescribed by the theory, allows discussing the 
expected “noise” observed in the treatments from a new perspective.  
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Introduction 
A common issue in experimental economics (EE) is the trade-off between internal and external 
validity of the experiments. Campbell (1957) considered an experiment internally valid if the 
experimenter finds a significant difference between the treatment and the control conditions. This 
difference is only the result of the response of subjects to causal processes at play and excludes all 
extraneous mediating factors that influence such responses. On the other hand, external validity is a 
matter of generalization of experimental results outside the specific situation created in the 
laboratory (Druckman et al., 2012).  
Experiments conducted by economists tend to give priority to internal validity, by creating the 
laboratory conditions of control and replicability necessary to “evaluate the causal impacts of 
potentially informative explanatory variables” (Druckman et al., 2012).  These conditions imply a 
simplification of the experimental settings, making them very distant from the real life, and therefore 
creating a problem in terms of external validity of the experiments (i.e. generalization of the 
outcomes). 
Conversely, in the field of “adaptive and participatory research” (Barreteau et al., 2011), role-playing 
games (RPGs) are an “extremely simplified representation of the problem, yet sufficient to reflect the 
complexity of the system by taking the main dynamics and interactions into account” (Bousquet et 
al., 2011). As a consequence, protocols are highly contextualised. Obviously, RPGs are weak in terms 
of internal validity, as their complexity makes it difficult to interpret the results and identify the 
factors influencing the behaviour observed during the game (Desolé et al., 2009). Another problem 
with RPGs used as participatory platforms resides in their specificity to the local situation where they 
have been constructed, making them unsuitable for other similar utilisations (out-scaling) and 
consequently hampering the accumulation of knowledge that could result from this generalization 
(Rouchier, 2007). 
Field experiments offer an intermediate set-up, where internal validity is preserved through rigorous 
protocols and control of the explanatory variables, but in order to increase external validity, the 
experiments are conducted far from laboratories, in the presence of more real conditions and with 
real stakeholders.  
According to Shadish et al. (2002), “external validity covers at least four aspects of experimental 
design: whether the participants resemble the actors who are ordinarily confronted with these 
stimuli; whether the context (including the time), within which actors operate, resembles the context 
(and time) of interest; whether the stimulus used in the study resembles the stimulus of interest in 
the world; and whether the outcome measures resemble the actual outcomes of theoretical and 
practical interest”.  
We concentrated our analysis on the context of the experiment, which was identified with the level 
of information given to players through instructions, exchanged by players during an experiment or 
accumulated by players before or during an experiment.  
The trade-off between internal and external validity of experiments assumes a different weight in 
function of the social discipline where these experiments are conducted. “While psychologist pay 
primary attention to issues associated with internal validity, political scientists tend to focus, almost 
exclusively, on problems associated with external validity” (Mc Dermott, 2012).  
Limiting our analysis to EE and RPGs for participatory research, we observe that on one hand 
experimental economists are looking for more external validity in order to generalize the results of 
their abstract and controlled protocols, while on the other hand, although primarily driven by social 
validation (Le Page et al., 2011), RPGs designers are in quest of improved internal validity and 
therefore a higher capacity to interpret the games’ outcomes and the factors that affect players’ 
behaviour. 
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If we identify then a positive relation between the quantity of context (i.e. more realistic and 
informed set-up of a protocol) and the external validity of an experiment, we observe a tendency to 
contextualize abstract experiments in EE. At the same time, some RPGs designers (Ferrand et al., 
2009; Abrami et al., 2012) tend to simplify their platforms to face the problems of interpretation and 
accumulation of knowledge indicated by Desolé et al. (2009) and Rouchier (2007). 
A crucial scientific issue is therefore the research of the quantity and quality of context that are 
“good” for both experimental protocols and RPGs in order to reach the acceptable compromise 
between internal and external validity in both disciplines and to allow simplification towards some 
accumulation of knowledge in RPGs.  
A research programme that aims at answering this question consists for EE in finding out first how 
the context, as the previously defined array of variables, has a causal impact on player’s behaviours, 
and then whether or not it is possible to isolate this impact and measure it quantitatively and 
objectively.  
The experimental observations derived from such a research programme would provide useful 
suggestions and guidance for both economists and RPG designers in terms of the priorities to follow 
when choosing the contextual components constituting an experimental protocol or a game 
platform. 
The idea developed in this paper is that experimentation makes it possible to analyse the question of 
the influence of context on players’ behaviour.  
More precisely, we are interested in characterising and quantifying the causal impact that 
introducing different dimensions of a predefined context in a completely decontextualized protocol 
has on the experiment’s outcomes.  
In other terms: do contextualized treatments, introducing more variables that influence players’ 
behaviour, create a noise (Babcock et al., 1995) that increases the dispersion of players’ responses if 
compared to the abstract control, or vice versa may the context rather be seen as a catalyst 
accelerating the learning processes without modifying the cognitive processes of reasoning (Cooper 
and Kagel, 2003)? 
To answer our research question, we proceeded through the following steps.  
First we proposed a new analytical framework for the definition and study of the contextual 
dimensions of an EE set-up. Then we designed an experimental protocol derived from the 
degradation of a role-playing game called “KatAware”, created and used in South Africa to deal with 
decision-making about the allocation of water resources (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007) in a catchment 
area. Our protocol consists of a coordination problem where three players must choose to allocate 
the grand-coalition payoff following the Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) theoretical reference. 
Finally, we used the analytical framework to build contextualized treatments in order to test our 
hypotheses about the impact of context on players’ behaviour. The hypotheses that we test are 
therefore on the gap that the introduction of contextual elements creates between the outcomes of 
the untreated state (abstract) and the outcomes of the contextualized treatments.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the new analytical framework to define and 
analyse the contextual dimensions of an experimental protocol; section 2 presents the coordination 
problem and section 3 illustrates how the coordination problem was converted into an experimental 
protocol aiming at testing hypotheses about the influence of context on players’ behaviour. Section 4 
presents and discusses the results of the experiments. Section 5 concludes, indicates the limits and 
caveats of the exercise and provides perspectives for future work. 
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1. A framework for the analysis of context in economic experiments 
1.1 Context and players’ behaviour 
In endeavouring to obtain better control of the experiment parameters, investigators in EE agree that 
it is necessary to eliminate every element that might disrupt participants’ behaviour. In light of the 
loss of control over behaviour caused by the different representations envisaged by the players, the 
introduction of context in experiments can be perceived as noise (Babcock et al., 1995). The 
underlying idea is that the participants have the same interpretation of a neutral and generic piece of 
information, hence the desire for maximum control to ensure the validity and robustness of the 
results. 
Nevertheless, this idea of a homogenous perception of a neutral context by the players is called into 
question. According to certain authors, introducing references to reality has the effect of limiting 
players’ confusion with regard to the decisions to be taken and the actions to be implemented. In 
other words, players can lose their ability to reason when they are placed in an environment which is 
too abstract and which, by definition, is unfamiliar to them as they do not encounter such abstract 
contexts in reality (Loewenstein, 1999; Loomes, 1999). If the subjects understand neither the 
question posed, by means of the instructions, nor the consequences of the decisions they are to 
take, no control over the players’ motivations is guaranteed (Pillutla and Chen, 1999). 
Faravelli (2007) compared the results obtained by conducting an experiment involving different 
samples of students enrolled in economics or sociology courses, either in the first year or subsequent 
years of their study course. He noted that the differences between the answers observed in abstract 
treatments disappear once context has been introduced, thereby corroborating the hypothesis made 
by Loewenstein (1999). The context provided players with indicators enabling them to behave in 
accordance with a common representation of this context. The players gave the same answer 
irrespective of their individual characteristics (level of studies and specialist subject), thereby 
contradicting – through the homogenisation of their behaviours – the idea that context acts as a 
noise which alters the interpretation of the economic question asked. 
Cooper and Kagel (2003) identified two levels of contextual influence on behaviour. They adopted 
the hypothesis of a first “weak” level where context may be seen as a catalyst, accelerating the 
learning processes (established as the periods are repeated) without modifying the cognitive 
processes of reasoning. This “weak” level differs from the second “strong” level where context 
influences both the learning processes and the cognitive processes of decision-making, altering 
behaviours and encouraging much more sophisticated reasoning than that observed in abstract 
situations. Cooper and Kagel (2003) concluded that introducing contextual elements into protocols 
by means of a “weak” contextual effect is likely to allow behaviours to converge more quickly on the 
equilibrium observed in the protocols where these contextual elements do not exist. 
 
1.2 Breaking context down into four attributes 
The literature presented above highlights the importance to experiments of the effect of context on 
participants’ behaviour. The decisions taken by the players are based on social and ethical 
representations of the problems submitted to them. These representations depend on the context in 
which the agents are placed, i.e. the information available to them. Certain authors, such as 
Loewenstein (1999), recommend not attempting to eliminate every contextual reference in the 
protocols, instead endeavouring to understand the influence of context on behaviour. To this end, 
investigators should go beyond the usual methodological standards in constructing their protocol in 
order to reflect reality more accurately, either by giving the players the ability to communicate 
(Cooper et al., 1989), or by selecting samples of players which are more representative of society 
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(Harrison and List, 2004), or by introducing a less abstract informational content in the instructions 
given to the players (Wang, 1996).  
The assessment of the influence of each of these different elements on the players’ representations  
is likely offer a better understanding of the decision-making processes in an experimental situation. 
An improved knowledge of the effects produced by the introduction of contextual elements helps to 
target the construction of contextualised protocols more effectively and thus to improve the quality 
of experimental results, particularly their external validity, i.e. the capacity to extrapolate the 
observations made in the experimental conditions with regard to reality (Loewenstein, 1999). 
In EE, the context is more often than not reduced to the information provided in the instructions and 
its effect is limited to the “framing effect”, the definition of which resulting from the works of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) is that a minimal change in the description of the same decision-making 
problem can lead to a reversal of the players’ preferences.  
To answer our research question about the influence of context on players’ behaviour, we argue that 
it is relevant not to limit the definition of a game context to this single aspect, but rather to consider 
it more broadly in terms of information conveyed in the protocol and characterised by: 
 
- the information that players accumulate during the game session referring to the repetition 
of periods in a session and the subsequent learning effect that this can produce on players; 
- the information provided to the players through the game instructions, or information flows 
from the scientist to the players; 
- the information exchanged among the players by means of communication, or shared 
information; 
- the information already in possession of the players referring to the players’ experience. 
 
Scientists exercise considerable control over the information given to the players, and by limiting the 
periods of a session to one (one-shot games) or few they can reduce to the minimum the learning 
effect. The information in possession of the players can be partially controlled by the selection of 
homogeneous groups of participants (e.g. students) to a game session, while the information 
exchanged among players can be observed through methods that constrain communication (cf. 
below). 
Breaking down the context of a game, interpreted as a level of information, enables us to identify 
four elementary dimensions or attributes: 
1. The first attribute – “REPETITION” – takes into account the progression of the periods which 
contributes to the learning process, i.e. the accumulation of information during the game leading 
to increased knowledge. By accumulating information, a player can change his behaviour in 
order to adapt to the characteristics of the game and the decisions taken by his partners (Roth 
and Erev, 1995; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). One shot games do not allow for learning. By 
repeating the same identical period or by playing a dynamic game (i.e. the situation of the game 
in period n depends on the decisions taken during the n-1 previous periods), the players can 
accumulate information and thus increase their experience. 
2. The second attribute – “ILLUSTRATION” – is the level of information provided in the instructions. 
Its influence is examined in the literature via the “framing effect” mentioned previously (Tversky 
and Kahnemann, 1981; Kuhberger and Tanner, 2010). 
3. The third attribute – “COMMUNICATION” – considers the fact that when they are assembled in 
groups in which individual decisions affect the collective results, players can share information. 
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This exchange can take place in person or using IT media (audio, video or messenger) and causes 
a change in the way the players understand the game, irrespective of whether it is improved or 
disturbed (Cardenas, 2003; Carpenter et al., 2004; Ostrom, 2006). This attribute can be 
controlled: the minimum level is obtained in the laboratory by isolating the players in 
compartments (no visual contact) and preventing them from speaking to each other. In these 
conditions, the only exchange is a signal sent (at the end of each period) by each player 
summarising the decisions taken by him. 
4. Finally, the fourth attribute – “EXPERIENCE” – considers the level of information acquired by the 
player before he joins the game. Experience influences the player’s interpretation of the 
information provided in the instructions, exchanged with his partners and acquired during the 
repetitions (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1997; Harrison and List, 2004). 
This analytical framework composed of four dimensions of the context (Figure 1), which we call RICE 
from the initials of each attribute, can be used to test in the laboratory the causal impact that each 
dimension has on players’ behaviour. 
In fact, each attribute of the context contributes to the complexity of the protocol. The experimental 
methodology allows isolating each of these attributes and assessing their influence on the players’ 
behaviours. Based on the fact that an experimental protocol can have different levels of 
contextualisation (Wang, 1996; Harrison and List, 2004), the impact of each of these attributes can 
be tested separately using the same protocol. Comparing the results obtained in this way enables 
assessing the impact of the four dimensions of context on players’ behaviour. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The RICE analytical framework representing the four dimensions of the context in 
a protocol 
 
2. Coordination in a cooperative game theory set-up  
2.1 Origins of our experiment 
According to Colman (2006), “A coordination game is an interactive decision in which two or more 
players have a common interest in coordinating their actions and their expectations of one another’s 
actions”. Following this definition, a coordination game can be something different from the class of 
competitive games with multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in which players choose the same or 
corresponding strategies.  
Our experimental protocol is based on a coordination game derived from the degradation1 of a RPG 
called “KatAware” (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007), designed and used within a Companion Modelling 
(Bousquet et al., 2011) project in South Africa to deal with the allocation of water resources in a 
catchment area. Based on some regularities observed during the RPG sessions and referring players’ 
behaviour to Cooperative Game Theory (CGT), a Transferable Utility (TU) CGT model (Dinar et al., 
2008) was implemented. The resulting 3-player coordination game where players can choose among 
                                                          
1 For more information on this approach, cf. Désolé (2011).  
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a discrete number of options for payoff allocation in a super additive framework is based on the 
model by Dinar et al. (2008) and allows verifying whether players behave following the CGT 
theoretical reference, i.e. on the basis of the common advantage, coordinate their actions and 
reallocate among them the payoff obtained together in an efficient and equitable way. 
The solutions of such a game can be presented in the form of a set of allocations complying with 
certain conditions. Among these solution sets, the core (Gillies, 1953) consists of several elements 
satisfying both the conditions of coalitional rationality and of efficiency, which guarantee the 
superadditivity2 of the game and satisfy the conditions of rationality (individual and coalitional). If the 
core consists of several allocations, the players are asked to choose the one which seems the most 
equitable. Several single solution concepts are proposed by CGT to identify a solution from the set 
proposed: the nucleolus, the kernel, the “T-value” and the Shapley value. The Shapley value (1953) is 
calculated for each player according to his participation in the grand coalition, evaluated by means of 
the average of his marginal contributions to each of the coalitions of which he is a member. The unit 
to be taken into consideration for the calculation, therefore, corresponds to what a player 
contributes to a coalition by joining it. According to the Shapley value, the amount that player i gets 
given a coalitional game (v,N) is: 
))()((
!
)!1(!
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i\
SviSv
n
SnS
v
NS
i  
Where n is the total number of players and the sum extends over all subsets S and N not containing 
player i. All other terms refer to note 2. 
 
2.2 The coordination set-up 
Our objective was not to observe the coordination process itself but rather to test hypotheses that 
relate to the impact of introducing the contextual elements presented in the RICE framework on the 
decisions taken by players. As one of those contextual dimensions is represented by the information 
that players accumulate over a game session (Repetition), we needed to repeat easily a certain 
number of periods in a controlled environment using the same players. For this reason we adopted a 
3-player game like Rapoport and Kahan (1976) did, but with a different game structure.  
Games in which it is possible to create partial coalitions, such as that of Rapoport and Kahan (1976), 
require very long time frames. In our protocol, the 3 players automatically play together at the start 
of each period (i.e. the grand coalition was assumed as a given3). Partial coalitions4 are not played 
and the information concerning them is provided to players for the purpose of mutual information 
only. 
The structure of our cooperative game is presented in table 1.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Where N is a finite set of n players (or “grand coalition”) in a game with transferable utility, S and T are subsets of N 
(or sub-coalitions with S  T=Ø) and v(S) is the payoff obtained by the coalition S. A game is superadditive if for all 
coalitions S and T included in N, v(S  T) ≥ v(S) + v(T). 
3 As the game is superadditive, it is a necessary consequence of the hypothesis of player rationality. 
4 The instructions avoid the term “coalition”, which is referred to as an “association” or “group”. Cf. the detailed 
instructions in the annex. 
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Each member of the group remains independent 
Player A earns 75,000 ecus 
Player B earns 100,000 ecus 
Player C earns 200,000 ecus 
Players A and B work together The association A-B earns 175,000 ecus 
Player C earns 200,000 ecus 
Players A and C work together The association A-C earns 275,000 ecus 
Player B earns 100,000 ecus 
Players B and C work together The association B-C earns 350,000 ecus 
Player A earns 75,000 ecus 
The 3 members of the group work together The association A-B-C earns 500,000 ecus 
Table 1. Structure of the cooperative game 
 
As this CGT TU 3-player game structure is superadditive following the definition provided above, the 
players have a real incentive to cooperate within the grand coalition.  
The terminology of CGT defines the payoffs allocation as a function x = (x1, …, xn)  R
N. The allocation 
choices therefore belong to the continuous space RN. In order to ensure that our protocol is more 
playable (in particular to overcome the absence of communication between the players), different 
choices for the grand coalition’s payoff allocations are proposed using cards, among which at each 
period the players must choose the allocation they prefer. The use of cards represents a 
discretisation of the choices, breaking the condition of continuity of cooperative games and 
therefore making our protocol rather a coordination game. The agreement among players is 
underpinned by the unanimity rule: if three players all coordinate together on the same card, the 
corresponding amounts are allocated; if not, each one receives the gain associated with the players 
playing as singletons (status quo). 
The seven proposals (cards) of payoff allocation are as follows: 
 Card 1 Card 2 Card 3 Card 4 Card 5 Card 6 Card 7 
Player A 498,000 117,000 1,000 100,000 166,666 1,000 75,000 
Player B 1,000 142,000 1,000 150,000 166,666 498,000 100,000 
Player C 1,000 241,000 498,000 250,000 166,666 1,000 200,000 
Table 2. Cards available to the players: amounts in ecus 
 
The numbering on the cards, randomly chosen, is set to be identical for each treatment of the 
protocol described in the following section. Card 7 does not propose a distribution of the grand 
coalition’s payoff, instead offering the status quo that leaves the players with the payoff that they get 
remaining singletons. Choosing card 7 means choosing non-cooperation, being it explicit or non-
intentional following the failure of the group members to coordinate. Cards 1 to 6 are based on 
different criteria of the distribution of the 500,000 ecus of the grand coalition 5. These criteria are 
explained below. 
                                                          
5 Players must coordinate themselves (i.e. choose the same card) to reach a consensus for the allocation of the grand 
coalition payoff. However, players can be willing to stay in the grand coalition, but they can have different ideas in 
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 “Selfish” criterion: cards 1, 3 and 6 
A player proposes to leave only the minimum (1,000 ecus) to his partners in the grand coalition and 
to keep the rest, i.e.:  
v(ABC) – 2 * 1,000 = 500,000 – 2,000 = 498,000 ecus 
This selfish choice is independent of the role and values received as a singleton. Each player can 
therefore choose to be selfish, hence the fact that three symmetrical cards are proposed, each one 
favourable to one of the three players. These cards propose a very unfair allocation of the grand 
coalition payoff to the advantage of the proponent. It could be interpreted as a provocative choice, 
not really aiming at preserving the coalition.  
 
 “Strict egalitarian” criterion: card 5 
The egalitarian criterion often appears in the results of economic experiments, although it is not 
provided for by the theory for which the hypotheses are tested. Gamson (1964) proposes an 
egalitarian (or anti-competitive) theory which hypothesises that, rather than attempting to maximise 
their utility function, the players within a coalition attempt to minimise conflicts to maintain the 
social link within the group. In the case of super-additive games, egalitarian sharing of the grand 
coalition’s payoff is the ultimate form of anti-competitive sharing. Card 5 is designed as follows: 
1/3 * v(ABC) = 500,000 / 3 = 166,666.67 ecus 
Each player in the grand coalition receives exactly the same amount rounding down to the nearest 
ecu, where xi = 166,666 ecus
6. The condition of individual rationality is not respected. Player C 
receives an allocation of xC = 166,666 ecus, less than v(C) = 250,000 ecus. This allocation is not in the 
core and therefore is not expected as an outcome by the CGT. 
 
 “Intermediate egalitarian” criterion: card 2 
Gamson (1964) considers that strict egalitarian sharing is excluded from superadditive games in 
which the initial endowments are unequal, because the potential appearance of conflicts of interest 
is high. Supposing that coalitions form “along the lines of least resistance” (Gamson, 1964), we can 
consider that the line of resistance for each player, corresponds to the payoff received when that 
player operates as a singleton. An intermediate form of the anti-competitive theory may 
demonstrate the criterion of egalitarian sharing beyond these lines of resistance, i.e. an equal 
division of the surplus of the grand coalition (in relation to the situation where players are 
singletons). Card 2 is designed as follows: 
The sum of the payoffs received when the players operate as singletons is: 
v(A) + v(B) + v(C) = 375,000 ecus 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
terms of payoff allocation. In particular, some cards (i.e. 1,3 and 6) propose an allocation plan that is clearly 
representative of a willingness to break the grand coalition. The choice of these cards would then show that, despite 
the superadditivity of the game, a player has either not understood the interest of cooperation or is not prepared to 
coordinate his efforts with the others.  
6 The sum of the shares of the grand coalition distributed to the players is thus equal to 3 * 166,666, i.e. 499,998 
ecus. We consider that the difference of 2 ecus between the sum of the shares actually allocated by card 5 and the 
payoff of the grand coalition is negligible: the difference of 2 ecus represents 0.0004% of the 500,000 ecus of the 
grand coalition. 
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The surplus of the grand coalition in relation to the singletons situation is the difference between the 
two situations: 
 = v(ABC) – 375,000 = 125,000 ecus 
The surplus is shared equally between the 3 players, i.e.  / 3 = 125,000 / 3 = 41,666 ecus each, in 
addition to the payoff obtained in the singletons situation.  
 
Player A will receive v(A) + 41,666 = 116,666 ecus rounded up to xA = 117,000 ecus.  
Player B will receive v(B) + 41,666 = 141,666 ecus rounded up to xB = 142,000 ecus. 
     Player C will receive v(C) + 41,666 = 241,666 ecus rounded down to xC = 241,000 ecus. 
The allocation of card 2 complies with the conditions of efficiency, individual rationality and 
coalitional rationality; it is located in the core and therefore is an expected outcome in terms of CGT. 
 
 “Equitable and efficient” criterion according to the Shapley value: card 4 
We have already seen that the Shapley value is calculated for each player on the basis of his 
participation in the cooperation, evaluated by means of the average of his marginal contributions to 
each of the coalitions of which he is a member. 
The allocation x = (xA, xB, xC) of card 4, calculated according to the Shapley criterion  = ( A, B, C), 
takes into account all the levels of cooperation (singletons, partial coalitions and grand coalition) and 
complies with the conditions of efficiency, individual rationality and coalitional rationality; it is 
located in the core and therefore is an expected outcome in terms of CGT. 
 
3. The experimental protocol 
3.1 Treatments 
The protocol is designed on the basis of the coordination game presented in the previous section to 
a) capture the different dimensions of the context defined in the RICE analytical framework: 
repetition (facilitating the learning process), illustration, communication, and experience, and b) 
measure the causal impact of each dimension (explanatory variables) on participants’ behaviour.  
As the causal stimulus of our experiment is represented by the introduction into an abstract7 
protocol (control, coded here as 0.0) of the four dimensions of context presented in section 1, we 
built different treatments containing these dimensions and contrasted the outcomes of the 
treatment groups with those of the control group. 
The possible emergence of a learning effect due to the accumulation of information during the 
session was tested through the repetition within each treatment (including the control) of 15 periods, 
each player retaining his role in the same group of 3 subjects during the whole treatment 
(“partner” mode). The effect of illustration was tested by contrasting the outcome of the control 
(0.0) first with the results of treatments illustrated in an elementary manner by means of a single 
phrase (“the experiment focuses on a problem of water resource management”) (treatment 0.1), 
then by a narrative explaining the sources of heterogeneity of the individual gains in the water sector 
(different productivity of water – treatment 0.2), and finally by a narrative explaining the sources of 
heterogeneity in the industrial sector (different seniority of employees – treatment 0.3). The effect of 
                                                          
7 We call the control “abstract” in contrast with the “contextualized” treatments, which are characterized by the 
introduction of various attributes of context. 
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communication was tested allowing the players to exchange information8 before periods 1, 6 and 11 
in a non-illustrated treatment (1.0) and in the most illustrated treatment in the water sector (1.2). 
Two important aspects are worthwhile noticing at this stage: first, as we deal with university students 
and not with expert subjects, the “E” dimension of our RICE framework is not explored so far, and 
consequently we can rename RIC the framework used for this specific experiment. Second, the R 
dimension is present in all treatments including the control starting from period 2. The treatment 0.0 
is therefore the control only at period 1, as only at this stage all the RIC dimensions are absent. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Following CGT, players facing a superadditive situation coordinate their choices, stay in the grand 
coalition and choose to share the resulting payoff following the Shapley value (most efficient and 
equitable solution). In the control (0.0) at period 1, without illustration, communication and prior to 
any repetition, we might expect a certain consensus around this theoretical solution. Our experiment 
then tests first whether theoretical expectations are confirmed in the control (0.0 at period 1).  
All the following hypotheses to be tested in the experiment concern the progressive introduction of 
context dimensions (RIC) through treatments.  
Repetition should allow a learning effect in players (Cooper and Kagel, 2003). This effect changes 
player’s behaviour in the direction of an improved respect of the theoretical expectations (Andreoni, 
1995; Laury et al., 1999) (H0). Introducing an illustration is likely to cause greater uncertainty 
concerning the choices made (Babcock et al., 1995; Binmore, 1999). Adding this contextual 
dimension in the experiment creates noise that increases the dispersion of players’ responses in 
selecting a payoff allocation mechanism if compared to the control (H1). This noise increases as the 
illustration of context becomes richer (H2). The noise does not depend on the specific content of the 
illustration (H3). As communication should facilitate coordination (Brosig et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 
2006), we can make the hypothesis that communication does operate a contrary effect to refocus 
the choices on a preferred payoff allocation configuration (H4).   
 
3.3 Experimental conditions 
The participants in the sessions were chosen from a database of subjects containing the third-year 
students enrolled at the universities in Montpellier and provided by the Laboratory of Experimental 
Economics in Montpellier (L.E.E.M.). We consider that the samples are homogenous and consist of 
subjects with the same experience concerning the context studied. Each treatment brings together 
12 groups of 3 players whose role within the group remains the same throughout the game session 
(“partner” procedure). These players only participate in one treatment to ensure the independence 
of the results (“between subjects” procedure). 
At the start of the session, the instructions (cf. Annex) are provided in printed format. The 
participants read the instructions individually then the experimenter reads them aloud. The players 
are given a comprehension test on the computer to check that they have understood the 
instructions. The rest of the session is managed by computer. 
The session takes place over 15 identical periods. For each period, the individual choices and the 
cards which establish the payoff allocation to the players are displayed on the screen for the 
members of the group (but not the results of the other groups) before starting the subsequent 
                                                          
8 Information was exchanged by players through “constrained communication”, inspired by the “Numerical Cheap 
Talk (NCT) communication” used by Bochet et al. (2006). Details on the adoption of this method can be found in 
Désolé (2011). 
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period. The learning process during the successive sessions therefore relates to the preferences of 
the other players in the group and can be conducive to attempting to coordinate with regard to an 
allocation (one card, one behaviour in accordance with the expectations of the other members who 
form these small societies of 3 players).  
The players are paid at the end of the 15 periods in accordance with their performance, which 
depends on the choices they will have made throughout the game, at a rate of €0.6 for 100,000 ecus. 
For instance, the sum of €3 is distributed to each group of players every time the group succeeds in 
agreeing on the same means of sharing the 500,000 ecus of the grand coalition. 
 
3.4 Theoretical predictions 
Following CGT predictions, in the proposed superadditive set-up participants should coordinate 
around cards representing payoff allocations situated in the core, such as card 4 (Shapley) 
preferentially, or even card 2 (intermediate egalitarian).  
Using the Gately index of “propensity to disrupt the grand coalition”9, we can predict the interest of 
the three players in a grand coalition to coordinate around cards 2 and 4 (Tab. 3): 
 Card 2 Card 4 
Player A 0.79 2 
Player B 1.98 1.5 
Player C 2.05 1.5 
Table 3. Gately indices (propensity of players to disrupt the coalition) for the allocations of 
the grand coalition’s payoff in the core 
In table 3, we observe that the propensity of player A (GA = 2) to disrupt the coalition of card 4 
(Shapley allocation) is higher than for players B and C (GB = GC = 1.5). Players B and C have a high 
propensity (GB and GC  2) to disrupt the coalition of card 2 (“intermediate egalitarian” allocation) 
when that of player A is lower (GA = 0.79). Players B and C have similar preferences, oriented towards 
card 4 rather than card 2. The analysis of the Gately indices (in which the payoffs v(N-{i}) of the 
                                                          
9 Gately (1974) introduced the concept of “propensity to disrupt the grand coalition”. He defined this concept as the 
relationship between: (a) what the other players lose if player i chooses not to cooperate and (b) what player i loses 
in this case (i.e. if he refuses to cooperate). If N is the grand coalition comprising n players, for all i  N, the 
propensity Gi to disrupt the coalition (x1,…,xn) can be expressed as follows: 
)(
)(
ivx
iNvx
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j
i  
where xi is the allocation received by player i once the payoff v(N) of the grand coalition has been shared, v({i}) is the 
payoff received by i when it plays as a singleton and v(N-{i}) is the payoff of the coalition comprising all the players 
except i. 
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partial coalitions are taken into account) therefore highlights the symmetry of preferences of B and 
C, reflecting the fact that the payoff v(BC) is more advantageous for these two players than the 
payoffs of the partial coalitions that each one forms separately with player A – v(AB) and v(AC) 
respectively. 
While player A has considerable “power of disruption” in the stability of the choice of card 4, he has 
less power in the tacit bargaining with players B and C within the grand coalition due to his weak 
position in the partial coalitions. Although he prefers card 2, card 4 is not the worst solution for him 
and this should therefore be the resulting point of coordination, confirming the prediction of 
cooperative game theory which considers the Shapley allocation (represented by card 4) as the 
players’ preferred allocation.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Measure of the dispersion of players’ choices between treatments 
The factual effects of the introduction of a variable (attribute of the context) on players’ behaviour 
are measured through the difference between the outcomes (i.e. players’ choices of cards proposing 
different payoff allocations) of the treatment characterized by that variable and the outcomes of the 
control10. 
The experiment outcomes from the control group (0.0) at period 1 are contrasted first with the 
results from treatments (0.1, 0.2, 0.3), which introduce progressively illustration, and then with the 
results from treatments (1.0, 1.2), which allow communication. The repetition of periods in all 
treatments tests the emergence of a learning effect, and therefore outcomes between and within all 
treatments at periods 1 and 15 are contrasted as well.  
As we are examining the distribution of choices and not the individual components thereof, in order 
to assess the difference between the results of the various treatments (e.g. the causal effects of the 
studied variables), we favour a Chi-squared test.  
If m1 and m0 are two distributions of the n individuals of a population split into k classes (j=1,2,..k) in 
two distinct circumstances (treatments), then: 
k
j j
jj
m
mm
1 0
2
01 )(
1)-²(k 
Where mij represents the number of individuals in class j in the i treatment (i=0, 1). DF=(k-1)
 11.  
In our analysis, we only examine the distribution of the choices without distinguishing either the 
roles allocated to the players (A, B or C) or the failure or success in coordinating within the grand 
coalitions. In other terms, we observe the players’ proposals to coordinate (or not) in order to 
allocate the grand coalition payoff, we do not analyse the actual coordination that follows. Twelve 
groups of 3 players took part in each treatment, i.e. 36 players (n). For each treatment, we will 
therefore analyse the distribution of the 36 choices expressed between the 4 classes of cards (k): 
class 1 (cards 7,1,3,6) corresponding to the refusal to cooperate; class 2 (card 5) corresponding to the 
allocation strictly egalitarian of the payoff of the grand coalition; class 3 (card 2) corresponding to the 
                                                          
10 The session conducted with the control group (i.e. in the absence of context attributes) in the text below is called 
control. 
11 We grouped cards 1, 3, 6 and 7 together because they are based on a similar criterion (refusal to cooperate). Card 
7 means in fact a direct and explicit refusal to stay in the grand coalition, while cards 1, 3, and 6 propose a 
outrageously unfair allocation of the grand coalition payoff to the advantage of the proponent, and have therefore 
no chance to be accepted by the two other players . We therefore have K = 4 and thus K-1 = 3 degrees of freedom. 
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intermediate egalitarian allocation of the payoff of the grand coalition (in the core); and class 4 (card 
4) corresponding to the allocation of the payoff of the grand coalition that follows the Shapley value 
(in the core). 
It is worthwhile noticing that the choice to coordinate between players in this protocol takes place at 
three progressive levels: i) staying in the grand coalition allocating the consequent payoff in a 
“reasonable”, i.e. not selfish, way (cards 2, 4 and 5); ii) choosing a payoff allocation within the core 
(cards 2 and 4); iii) choosing the Shapley value as a payoff allocation criterion (card 4).  
 
4.2  Respect of theoretical predictions in the control group 
Before moving into the test of our hypotheses about the influence of context on players’ behaviour, 
we needed to verify whether the theoretical predictions are respected within the control group (0.0).  
We therefore checked the distribution of players’ choices at period 1, which is the only situation 
where all dimensions of context following the RICE framework are absent.  
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ment 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 
1 0.0 6 22 4 4 
Table 4. Control group’s choices at period 112  
Table 4 shows that 30 players out of 36 choose to coordinate and stay in the grand coalition, but 22, 
the large majority, choose card 5 (strictly egalitarian) rather than the payoff allocation solutions 
which reside in the core according to CGT.  
This result can be interpreted as a Schelling effect (Schelling, 1960). The Schelling effect consists of 
the emergence of a focal point for the coordinating players far from the theoretical predictions. “A 
combination of actions may function as a focal point if it stands out from others because of some 
property of prominence or salience that it possesses, even if its distinguishing feature is a 
psychological or cultural attribute that is filtered out of its abstract representation in orthodox game 
theory” (Colman, 2006). 
In the absence of communication and at the beginning of the sessions, a certain consensus around a 
sharing mechanism (focal point) other than the Shapley value, or even other than a mechanism 
residing in the core, characterised the choices of players.  
This important result puts our protocol into a situation where the control does not produce a full 
convergence of results towards the theoretical predictions (card 4 or even card 2 in the core). 
Subsequently, a dispersion of results in the treatments due to the noise provoked by the introduction 
of contextual dimensions does not necessarily mean an increased distance from the theoretical 
predictions. It is then possible to find out that the introduction of contextual dimensions influences 
players’ behaviour positively, increasing the convergence of choices towards the theoretical 
equilibrium rather than decreasing it. 
 
                                                          
12 The cards are presented in tables 4 to 11 following the same order as in section 2.2, where they are explained. 
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4.3 Repetition of periods and learning effect 
At period 15, players of the control group (0.0) shift their choices from card 5 to cards 4 and 2, while 
the refusals to cooperate are divided by two (Table 5). This result indicates the existence of a 
learning effect between period 1 and period 15 (confirmed by the high Chi-squared calculated 
between the two distributions). That learning, in the absence of all other contextual dimensions, 
increases players’ willingness to coordinate their choices around an acceptable allocation of the 
grand coalition payoff (sum of choices of cards 5, 2, and 4) and facilitates the reach of the theoretical 
predictions (sum of choices of cards 2 and 4). 
We checked whether the same learning effect is observable in the other treatments as well. The Chi-
squared test shows clearly that the probability that the two distributions of choices at periods 1 and 
15 are different is 100% or close in all treatments, confirming the existence of a learning effect also 
when illustration and communication are introduced. This result would confirm H013. 
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ments 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 ² Prob 
1 0.0 6 22 4 4 
51.29 1.000 
15 0.0 3 10 6 17 
        
1 0.1 8 22 1 5 
76.68 1.000 
15 0.1 8 9 9 10 
        
1 0.2 3 23 6 4 
18.42 0.999 
15 0.2 3 12 11 10 
        
1 0.3 3 23 7 3 
14.59 0.997 
15 0.3 1 15 15 5 
        
1 1.0 4 19 1 12 
37.89 1.000 
15 1.0 6 6 6 18 
        
1 1.2 7 16 7 6 
35.15 1.000 
15 1.2 1 5 17 13 
Table 5. ²(3) test and players’ choices at periods 1 and 15 of all treatments 
The fact that the university students share an industrial culture rather than the culture of the 
irrigators, might be at the origin of the very marked Schelling effect at period 15 in treatment 0.3, 
with choices focusing on the “egalitarian” proposals (i.e. card 5 and card 2, together representing 
83% of the choices) to the detriment of card 4 (Shapley). 
 
                                                          
13
 Notice that in an experiment where 0.0 at period 1 produces results in line with the theoretical predictions, 
H0 is expected to be rejected.  
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4.4 Illustration 
To evaluate the “pure” illustration effect (without learning, without communication), we compared 
the distributions at period 1 between the control (0.0) and the illustrated treatments without 
communication (0.1, 0.2 and 0.3). 
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ments 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 ² Prob 
1 
0.0 6 22 4 4 
3.16 0.633 
0.1 8 22 1 5 
        
1 
0.0 6 22 4 4 
2.54 0.532 
0.2 3 23 6 4 
        
1 
0.0 6 22 4 4 
4.04 0.743 
0.3 3 23 7 3 
Table 6. ²(3) test at period 1 between treatments (0.0) and (0.1), (0.2), (0.3) 
The low Chi-squared statistics (Tab. 6) show that there is very little difference in the distribution of 
players’ choices between the control and the illustrated treatments. The “pure” illustration effect is 
therefore very weak. The players focus their decisions on card 5 irrespectively of the illustration 
provided (or not) in the instructions. “Pure” illustration does not have a sufficiently strong effect on 
the decisions to correct the Schelling effect observed in the abstract treatment (0.0) in favour of card 
5 (egalitarian). This result would reject H114 as no noise provoked by the illustration seems to 
influence the outcomes of treatments 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 at period 1. 
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ments 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 ² Prob 
1 
0.1 8 22 1 5 
28.37 1.000 
0.2 3 23 6 4 
        
1 
0.2 3 23 6 4 
0.41 0.063 
0.3 3 23 7 3 
Table 7.  ²(3) test at period 1 between treatments (0.1)-(0.2)  
and between treatments (0.2)-(0.3) 
Comparing the results of treatments (0.1) and (0.2) allows confirming H2, as the significant Chi-
squared between the outcomes demonstrates that noise increases as the illustration of the same 
context becomes richer. On the other side, there is no significant difference between the outcomes 
of treatments (0.2) and (0.3), showing that the increase in noise does not depend on the specific 
                                                          
14
 Notice that in an experiment where 0.0 at period 1 produces results in line with the theoretical predictions, 
the confirmation of H1 would correspond to a dispersion of treatments’ outcomes far from the allocations in 
the core.  
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content of the illustration, which moves in the experiment from a water-related problem (0.2) into 
an industry-related problem (0.3). This would confirm H3. 
The result is different when the illustration effect is combined with the learning effect resulting from 
repetition of periods. Showing this combined effect is possible through the comparison of the 
distribution of choices in period 15 for (0.0) and (0.1). 
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ments 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 ² Prob 
15 
0.0 3 10 6 17 
12.81 0.994 
0.1 8 9 9 10 
Table 8. ²(3) test at period 15 between treatments (0.0)-(0.1) 
 At the end of the session even a very light introduction of context in the protocol (the phrase “the 
experiment focuses on a problem of water resource management”) creates a noise and a consequent 
significant change in the behaviour of players captured by a relatively high Chi-squared at period 15.  
 
4.5 Communication 
To measure the “pure” communication effect (without illustration, without learning), we compare 
the distribution of choices at period 1 of the control with the treatment non illustrated but allowing 
communication (1.0) (Tab. 9). 
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ments 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 ² Prob 
1 
0.0 6 22 4 4 
19.32 0.999 
1.0 4 19 1 12 
Table 9. ²(3) test at period 1 between treatments (0.0)-(1.0) 
If we allow the subjects to exchange ideas, we observe a significant communication effect as early as 
at period 1. The choice of an egalitarian allocation (card 5) remains high, but there is an increased 
preference for the Shapley allocation (card 4) from the very first round. The refusals to cooperate 
also reduce from 6 to 4. 
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ments 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 ² Prob 
15 
0.0 3 10 6 17 
4.65 0.801 
1.0 6 6 6 18 
Table 10. ²(3) test at period 15 between treatments (0.0)-(1.0) 
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At period 15 of a non illustrated treatment, communication seems to have exhausted its effect (Tab. 
10). The distribution of players’ choices does not differ whether it is in the presence of 
communication or not. It is like if communication just speeds-up the reach of the theoretical 
prediction.  
Let us now consider the effect of introducing communication in an illustrated treatment. This is 
possible by comparing treatments (0.2) and (1.2) (Tab. 11). 
 
Period 
 
Cards 
 
Treat-
ments 
7,1,3,6 5 2 4 ² Prob 
1 
0.2 3 23 6 4 
8.63 0.965 
1.2 7 16 7 6 
        
15 
0.2 3 12 11 10 
9.58 0.977 
1.2 1 5 17 13 
Table 11. ²(3) test at periods 1 and 15 between treatments (0.2)-(1.2) 
We observe that distinct distributions of players’ choices exist both at periods 1 and 15, showing the 
effect of communication. The probability that distributions follow the same law is rejected at the 5% 
level.  
The results presented in Tab. 11 show that communication has an effect when introduced in 
illustrated treatments. But does this effect represent a noise as defined by Babcock et al. (1995), i.e. 
a disruption of the participants’ behaviour observed in the absence of all context attributes? Figures 
presented in table 9 answer positively for period 1, while if we compare the distribution of players’ 
choices at period 15 in treatment (1.2) and in the control we get a Chi-squared of 24.2, which is 
higher than the Chi-squared (7.4) resulting from the comparison at period 15 between treatment 
(0.2) and the control. Communication therefore amplifies and does not reduce the noise produced by 
the pure illustration on the control. This conclusion would reject H415. 
 
4.6 Combined effects of contextual attributes 
In an experiment where the control at period 1 produces results in line with the theoretical 
predictions, the study of the combined effects of contextual attributes is relatively straightforward, 
as repetition does not need to produce a learning effect to make the players converge towards 
theoretical predictions, while the noise increases the distance between the treatments’ results and 
the theoretical predictions. 
In our experiment the control did not produce results in line with the theoretical predictions, and as 
a consequence the learning effect produced by repetition was important in changing the behaviour 
of players in the direction of the theoretical predictions. At the same time, the noise could have both 
effects of increasing or reducing the distance between the treatments’ outcomes and the theoretical 
predictions. 
                                                          
15
 Notice that in an experiment where (0.0) at period 1 produces results in line with the theoretical predictions, 
the rejection of H4 would correspond to a dispersion of results in (1.0) and (1.2) if compared to the theoretical 
predictions. In the presented case, vice versa, the rejection of H4 corresponds to a convergence of results in 
(1.0) and (1.2) towards the theoretical predictions.  
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The combined effect of the contextual attributes was therefore more articulated. At period 1, for 
instance, the combination of illustration and communication (Tab. 11, first two rows) produced a 
noise and at the same time allowed a slight convergence of results towards the theoretical 
predictions (choice of cards 4 and 2 in the core). 
When repetition was introduced (at period 15), the learning effect was clear in all treatments (Tab. 
5). However, the combination of the learning effect with the effects of illustration (Tab. 8) and 
communication (Tab. 10) showed that communication had a lower influence than illustration in 
terms of noise creation (low Chi-squared) and a higher influence in terms of convergence towards 
theoretical predictions (less refusals to stay in the grand coalition, more choices of cards in the core). 
These results were confirmed by the outcomes presented in Tab. 5, where the strongest learning 
effect (highest Chi-squared) was observed either in the abstract treatment (0.0) or when minimum 
illustration was provided (0.1), while the weakest learning effect (lowest Chi-squared) corresponded 
to the illustrated treatments without communication (0.2 and 0.3). Conversely, the best convergence 
towards theoretical predictions (highest choice of cards in the core) corresponded to the treatments 
where communication was allowed (1.0 and especially 1.2, where the combined effect of repetition, 
illustration and communication coexists), while the worst convergence was in presence of illustration 
alone (0.1, 0.2, and 0.3). 
Our experiment, while confirming the production of noise (Babcock et al., 1995) through the 
introduction of contextual attributes in treatments, seems therefore to corroborate the hypotheses 
made by Faravelli (2007) and Loewenstein (1999) that context provides players with indicators 
enabling them to behave in accordance with a common representation of this context. According to 
Cooper and Kagel (2003), when learning processes are allowed, a “weak” contextual effect would 
also allow behaviours to converge more quickly towards theoretical predictions. In our experiment, 
however, illustration (which often in EE is the only context considered) proved to have lower effect 
than communication in terms of accelerating learning processes. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was twofold. We aimed first to provide a framework for the analysis of 
contextual components in an economic experiment. Then, based on the mentioned framework, we 
wanted to find out quantitatively and objectively whether and how the context has a causal impact 
on players’ behaviours.  
To do so, an experimental protocol based on a 3-player CGT TU game modified into a coordination 
game to improve its playability was constructed. The game is about the grand coalition payoff 
allocation among players in two different situations: one about water and another about an 
industrial context. Several treatments referring to the first three contextual attributes of the four 
(Repetition, Illustration, Communication, and Experience) included in the proposed analytical 
framework were designed and implemented in the laboratory to isolate the causal effect of each 
attribute on players’ behaviour. 
We wanted to test the following hypotheses: Repetition determines a learning effect (H0); 
Introducing an illustration increases the noise in terms of experiments’ outcomes, i.e. the dispersion 
of these outcomes in the treatments w.r.t. the control (H1); This noise grows as the illustration of the 
same context becomes richer (H2); The increase in noise does not depend on the specific content of 
the illustration (H3); Communication does operate a contrary effect to refocus the choices on a 
preferred payoff allocation configuration (H4). 
Results from the experiment confirmed H0, rejected H1, showing that illustration alone does not 
produce a significant noise in terms of treatment’s outcomes. H2 and H3 were confirmed, as more 
illustration was positively correlated with higher dispersion of outcomes w.r.t. the control, while the 
20 
 
specific topic of the illustration did not seem to influence that dispersion. H4 was also rejected as 
communication did not seem to be able to reduce the noise produced by illustration, but rather 
increased it. 
In our experiment the control did not produce results in line with the theoretical expectations 
(Shapley value, or even a payoff allocation residing in the core of the efficient and rational 
allocations), but rather a convergence to a focal point (Schelling effect) represented by the 
coordination towards an egalitarian allocation of the grand coalition payoff (card 5). This fact allowed 
interpreting the results of the treatments from two different perspectives, otherwise merged into 
the same criterion: 1) the production of noise (i.e. the increased dispersion of results in the 
treatments w.r.t. those of the control), and 2) the convergence of outcomes towards theoretical 
predictions. 
In the absence of repetition, the combination of illustration and communication produced noise and 
allowed at the same time a slight convergence of results towards the theoretical predictions. When 
repetition was introduced, the learning effect was clear in all treatments. However, communication 
had a lower influence than illustration in terms of noise creation and a higher influence in terms of 
convergence of outcomes towards theoretical predictions. 
These results contribute shedding some light, although partially, on the general problem of the 
quantity and quality of context that are “good” for both experimental protocols and RPGs in order to 
reach the acceptable compromise between internal and external validity in both disciplines.  
It is clear that the results of the present work cannot be generalized, but they represent an initial 
step in the direction of the interpretation of the causal impacts that selected attributes of the so-
called context have on players’ behaviour, both in EE and in RPGs.   
Among the substantial caveats still remaining and that should be approached in future works in this 
field, it can be mentioned the relative limited number of observations in the laboratory, which might 
affect negatively the statistical representativeness of the results obtained. This is also due to the 
relatively complex and long protocol (repetition of 15 periods for every treatment), which could be 
reduced to a “one shot” experiment in the future. The number of cards from which to choose the 
allocation of payoff could also be limited in order to speed and facilitate the interpretation of results. 
It is important to notice, finally, that the RICE framework was only partially implemented so far, as 
the experiments were conducted in the laboratory with university students and not in the field with 
expert subjects. The “E” for Experience will therefore be approached only when field experiments 
involving real stakeholders (e.g. farmers for the water problem) will take place.  
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Annex 
Instructions to players 
 
Control (0.0) 
The experiment you will participate is part of a study on decision-making. The instructions are simple. If you 
follow them and if you take good decisions, you will earn a non-negligible amount of money. All your answers 
are anonymous and are collected by a computer. You will indicate your choices through a computer in front of 
you and your earnings will be displayed on the screen. The amount of money you will earn will be provided to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
1) General framework of the experiment 
There are 18 participants in the room. At the beginning of the experiment the central computer will randomly 
gather you in 6 three-person groups. The setting-up of the groups will remain identical along the experiment. 
You cannot identify the other members of your three-person group and the two others cannot identify you. 
The experiment will last 15 identical periods. 
Your earnings will depend on your own decisions and at the same time on the decisions the two other 
members of your group will make. Each decision will allow you to earn ecus. All the ecus you will earn will be 
changed in euros and you will receive them in cash at the end of the experiment. The ecus-euros exchange rate 
is detailed at the end of these instructions. 
2) Situations 
At the beginning of the experiment, the central computer will assign a role to each member of the group. Then, 
one member will play role A, another role B and the last role C. In the instructions below, “player A” will 
designate the participant to whom role A is allocated, “player B” the person to whom role B is assigned and 
“player C” the one who assumes role C. Each member will know his role at the beginning of the experiment. 
Everyone keeps the same role along the experiment. 
Within each group, three situations are possible: 
(i) Each member remains independent, 
(ii) One member associates with another while the third member remains independent, 
(iii) The three members are associated. 
The earnings of the members or the earnings of the association change following the situation as stated in 
table 1. 
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Situation Earnings 
Each member remains independent 
Player A earns 75 000 ecus 
Player B earns 100 000 ecus 
Player C earns 200 000 ecus 
Players A and B are associated 
The association A-B earns 175 000 ecus 
Player C earns 200 000 ecus 
Players A and C are associated 
The association A-C earns 275 000 ecus 
Player C earns 100 000 ecus 
Players B and C are associated 
The association B-C earns 350 000 ecus 
Player C earns 75 000 ecus 
The three members are associated The association A-B-C earns 500 000 ecus 
Table 1 – The earnings according to the different situations 
In the experiment, only situations (i) and (iii) are considered. 
3) Decisions 
At each period you must choose one card among the 7 presented in table 2. Each card displays the earnings of 
each member of the group depending on his role (A, B or C). 
Note that cards 1 to 6 refer to situation (iii) while card 7 refers to situation (i). 
  Card 1 Card 2 Card 3 Card 4 Card 5 Card 6 Card 7 
Player A 498 000 117 000 1 000 100 000 166 666 1 000 75 000 
Player B 1 000 142 000 1 000 150 000 166 666 498 000 100 000 
Player C 1 000 241 000 498 000 250 000 166 666 1 000 200 000 
Table 2 – The seven cards 
If the three players choose the same card, they earn the corresponding amounts; otherwise, it is like card 7 was 
chosen by all. 
Example 1: 
Player A chooses card 7, player B chooses card 5 and player C chooses card 5. The three members of the group 
do not choose the same card, therefore card 7 is implemented in the group. Player A earns 75 000 ecus, player 
B earns 100 000 ecus and player C earns 200 000 ecus. 
Example 2: 
Player A chooses card 1, player B chooses card 1 and player C chooses card 1. The three members of the group 
choose card 1, therefore this card is implemented. Player A earns 498 000 ecus while players B and C earn 
1 000 ecus. 
4) The sequence of a period 
All the periods are identical. At the beginning of a period, the decision page is displayed on the screen in front 
of you. You must choose one card among the seven proposed. When all participants have made their decision, 
a new page appears in the screen which summarizes the following information: 
- The card you have chosen and the card your two partners in the group have chosen, 
- The card which is implemented for the group, 
- Your earnings for the period. 
The bottom part of the screen displays the history of the periods, i.e. the summary of the choices made during 
the previous periods and the cumulative earnings from the beginning of the session. The history of the periods 
is available from the decision page by clicking on the button “history”. 
5) Last details 
At the end of period 15, your complete earnings will be displayed on your screen and will be expressed in ecus 
and in euros, knowing that the exchange rate is 100 000 ecus = 0.6 euros. Then, if you earned 2 500 000 ecus 
through the experiment, you will leave the room with 15 euros in cash. 
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Treatment (0.1) 
In treatment 0.1, only one sentence is added to the instructions at the beginning of section 2 to distinguish them 
from the instructions distributed to the players in treatment 0.0. Then, in treatment 0.1 section 2 starts as 
follows: 
(…) 
2) Situations 
The experiment is articulated around a water management issue 
(…) 
 
Treatment (0.2) 
In treatment 0.2, a story was added to the instructions to distinguish them from the instructions distributed to 
the players in treatment 0.1. The particular sentence added in treatment 0.1 is maintained. Moreover, players 
are identified as farmers; every word “player” is substituted by the word “farmer” in tables 1 and 2 and in the 
two examples. 
In treatment 0.2, introduction and sections 1, 4 and 5 remain identical. Only sections 2 and 3 change and 
become as follows: 
(…) 
2) Situations 
The experiment is articulated around a water management issue 
You and the two other members of your group are irrigator farmers, meaning that you can irrigate your crop. 
Water is essential for your production. Water is naturally provided by rain, but irrigation allows you to 
provide  additional water to your crop in order to improve the development of the plant and then to get 
better yields. Without additional water your production is weaker and therefore your income is lower. 
The available water for irrigation is stored in a dam and you share it with the two other farmers of your 
group. The quantity of water stored in the dam is not sufficient to allow optimal irrigation for the three 
cultivated surfaces (your surface and the ones of the two other farmers). 
An irrigation scheme is implemented. It allows you to build associations of farmers in order to optimize the 
use of irrigation water from the dam. 
You and the two other farmers in your group get the same cultivated surface but with different yields. At the 
beginning of the experiment, the central computer will assign a yield (A, B or C) to each member of the group. 
Then, one member will have the yield A, another the yield B and the last the yield C. In the instructions below, 
“farmer A” will designate the participant to whom the yield A is allocated, “farmer B” the person to whom the 
yield B is assigned and “farmer C” the one who assume the yield C. Each member will know whether he is 
farmer A, B or C at the beginning of the experiment. Everyone keeps the same role along the experiment. 
Within each group, three situations are possible: 
(i) Each member remains independent, 
(ii) One member associates with another while the third member remains independent, 
(iii) The three members are associated. 
The earnings of the members or the earnings of the association change following the situation as stated in 
table 1. 
Situation Earnings 
Each member remains independent 
Farmer A earns 75 000 ecus 
Farmer B earns 100 000 ecus 
Farmer C earns 200 000 ecus 
Farmers A and B are associated 
The association A-B earns 175 000 ecus 
Farmer C earns 200 000 ecus 
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Farmers A and C are associated 
The association A-C earns 275 000 ecus 
Farmer C earns 100 000 ecus 
Farmers B and C are associated 
The association B-C earns 350 000 ecus 
Farmer C earns 75 000 ecus 
The three members are associated The association A-B-C earns 500 000 ecus 
Table 1 – The earnings according to the different situations 
In the experiment, only situations (i) and (iii) are considered. 
3) Decisions 
At each period you must choose one card among the 7 presented in table 2. Each card displays the earnings of 
each member of the group depending on his role (A, B or C). 
Note that cards 1 to 6 refer to situation (iii) while card 7 refers to situation (i). 
 Card 1 Card 2 Card 3 Card 4 Card 5 Card 6 Card 7 
Farmer A 498 000 117 000 1 000 100 000 166 666 1 000 75 000 
Farmer B 1 000 142 000 1 000 150 000 166 666 498 000 100 000 
Farmer C 1 000 241 000 498 000 250 000 166 666 1 000 200 000 
Table 2 – The seven cards 
If the three farmers choose the same card, they earn the corresponding amounts; otherwise, it is like card 7 
was chosen by all. 
Example 1: 
Farmer A chooses card 7, Farmer B chooses card 5 and Farmer C chooses card 5. The three members of the 
group do not choose the same card, therefore card 7 is implemented in the group. Farmer A earns 75 000 ecus, 
Farmer B earns 100 000 ecus and Farmer C earns 200 000 ecus. 
Example 2: 
Farmer A chooses card 1, Farmer B chooses card 1 and Farmer C chooses card 1. The three members of the 
group choose card 1, therefore this card is implemented. Farmer A earns 498 000 ecus while Farmer B and C 
earn 1 000 ecus. 
(…) 
 
Treatment (0.3) 
In treatment 0.3, the context of the story was changed from water to industry. Farmers become employees in a 
firm. The specific water related sentence of treatment 0.1 is removed. 
In treatment 0.3, introduction and sections 1, 4 and 5 remain identical. Only sections 2 and 3 change and 
become as follows: 
(…) 
2) Situations 
You and the two other members of your group are employees in a firm. Open markets and the intensification 
of competition conducted to a deterioration of the economic situation of your firm. Jobs are on the line and 
the top management decides to delegate responsibilities to the employees in order to improve efficiency in 
the firm. 
A new organization of work is implemented in your firm. It allows you to associate with your colleagues in 
order to optimize the firm’s production. 
You and two other employees of your firm get the same machinery, but with different productivity, due to 
workers’ different skills and experience. At the beginning of the experiment, the central computer will assign 
productivity (A, B or C) to each member of the group. Then, one member will get productivity A, another 
productivity B and the last productivity C. In the instructions below, “employee A” will designate the 
participant to whom productivity A is allocated, “employee B” the person to whom productivity B is assigned 
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and “employee C” the one who assume productivity C. Each member will know whether he is employee A, B or 
C at the beginning of the experiment. Everyone keeps the same role along the experiment. 
Within each group, three situations are possible: 
(i) Each member remains independent, 
(ii) One member associates with another while the third member remains independent, 
(iii) The three members are associated. 
The earnings of the members or the earnings of the association change following the situation as stated in 
table 1. 
Situation Earnings 
Each member remains independent 
Employee A earns 75 000 ecus 
Employee B earns 100 000 ecus 
Employee C earns 200 000 ecus 
Employees A and B are associated 
The association A-B earns 175 000 ecus 
Employee C earns 200 000 ecus 
Employees A and C are associated 
The association A-C earns 275 000 ecus 
Employee C earns 100 000 ecus 
Employees B and C are associated 
The association B-C earns 350 000 ecus 
Employee C earns 75 000 ecus 
The three members are associated The association A-B-C earns 500 000 ecus 
Table 1 – The earnings according to the different situations 
In the experiment, only situations (i) and (iii) are considered. 
3) Decisions 
At each period you have to choose one card among the 7 presented in table 2. Each card displays the earnings 
of each member of the group depending on his role (A, B or C). 
Observe that cards 1 to 6 refer to a situation (iii) while card 7 refers to the situation (i). 
  Card 1 Card 2 Card 3 Card 4 Card 5 Card 6 Card 7 
Employee A 498 000 117 000 1 000 100 000 166 666 1 000 75 000 
Employee B 1 000 142 000 1 000 150 000 166 666 498 000 100 000 
Employee C 1 000 241 000 498 000 250 000 166 666 1 000 200 000 
Table 2 – The seven cards 
If the three employees chose the same card, they earn the corresponding amounts; otherwise, it is like card 7 
was chosen by all. 
Example 1: 
Employee A chooses card 7, employee B chooses card 5 and employee C chooses card 5. The three members of 
the group do not choose the same card, therefore card 7 is implemented in the group. Employee A earns 
75 000 ecus, employee B earns 100 000 ecus and employee C earns 200 000 ecus. 
Example 2 
Employee A chooses card 1, employee B chooses card 1 and employee C chooses card 1. The three members of 
the group choose card 1, therefore this card is implemented. Employee A earns 498 000 ecus while employees 
B and C earn 1 000 ecus. 
(…) 
 
Communication: treatments (1.0) and (1.2) 
When players got the possibility to exchange information (in treatments 1.0 and 1.2) this section was added to 
the instructions just before section 5 “last details”. 
The previous sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the same as in the instructions of treatments 0.0 and 0.2 for treatments 
1.0 and 1.2 respectively. The previous section 5 becomes section 6. New section 5 is as follows. 
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5) Sending messages 
You get the possibility to communicate, still anonymously, with the two other members of your group before 
the periods 1, 6 and 11. The communication page will be displayed automatically on your screen. 
At the top of the screen, you can compose messages using 4 scroll-down menus. 
- The first one to indicate the choice or the refusal of a card (“I choose” or “I do not choose”). 
- The second one to select the card number. 
- The third one to choose, among 18 available sentences, the one that corresponds to the card you have 
chosen or refused. 
- The fourth one (non-compulsory) to select another card you want to compare with the chosen one. 
Once your message is composed, you click on the button “create the message”. Then you have to confirm the 
creation of your message. All created messages are chronologically added to the list at the bottom of your 
screen. You can order the messages through the buttons “up” and “down” from the one you consider the most 
important (at the top of the list) to the least (at the bottom). 
Once the list is completed and ordered, you click on the button “send messages” in order to communicate 
them to the two other members of your group. After having clicked on the button “send messages” you cannot 
get back to the previous step. When all the members of your group have finished their creation of messages, a 
new screen appears with all the messages created by the three members of the groups (yours included). 
In period 1 you have 8 minutes to compose your messages and order them in the list while in periods 6 and 11 
you have 5 minutes. Once the time is over, you cannot modify your list of messages. You must click on the 
button “send messages”. 
If you do not want to send messages, all you have to do is to click on the button “quit” (which appears on the 
screen as long as you do not have created any message). On the next screen it will be indicated at your place 
(A, B or C) that you have not sent messages. 
As for the history of periods, you can consult the history of the exchanged messages during the previous 
periods by clicking on the button “history of the messages”. 
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